Argument for · probabilistic
Hiddenness lowers likelihood of a maximally great being
Premises
- P1
If a maximally great being exists, it would aim to be known by all capable persons.
assumed - P2
Empirically, many capable persons report no convincing evidence of God (hiddenness).
established
∴
Inference (probabilistic)
Given the premise that a maximally great being would be non‑hidden, the observed hiddenness reduces the likelihood P(hiddenness | God).
→
Intermediate conclusion
The posterior probability P(God | hiddenness) is lower than the prior.
⊢
Conclusion
The posterior credence falls below a rational acceptance threshold.
Structural assessment
Depends on the assumed prior and on the strength of the likelihood assignment.
Recorded limitations (2)
- Assumes a specific motive for the being to be manifest.
- Does not account for alternative theodicies that permit hiddenness.