Divine Hiddenness Compatible with God via Soul‑Making Theodicy
The thesis claims that divine hiddenness can be reconciled with a maximally great, personal God if the hiddenness serves a soul‑making purpose, thereby functioning as a theodicy.
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The atlas · 9 theses · 13 relationships
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9 theses
The thesis claims that divine hiddenness can be reconciled with a maximally great, personal God if the hiddenness serves a soul‑making purpose, thereby functioning as a theodicy.
The thesis asserts that the universe’s existence, including its finite past, requires a cause external to the universe.
The thesis claims that the existence of objective moral values and duties provides evidence for a maximally great, personal, transcendent being as their grounding.
The thesis claims that the pervasive lack of clear, unambiguous experiences of a maximally great, personal deity constitutes strong evidential grounds to doubt such a being’s existence. This hinges on the idea that a perfectly loving God would make Himself known, and the observed hiddenness therefore counts against the hypothesis.
The thesis claims that a maximally great, personal, transcendent being (possessing omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence) cannot coexist with genuine libertarian human free will, making maximal greatness incoherent.
The evidential problem of evil argues that the existence of apparently gratuitous evil lowers the probability of a maximally great, personal, transcendent deity, providing strong evidential grounds for doubt.
The thesis claims that the notion of a maximally great being is internally contradictory and thus incoherent. The available sources only describe the concept (e.g., Anselm's definition) and note difficulties in logical vocabulary, offering no decisive proof of inconsistency.
The thesis claims that belief in a maximally great, personal, transcendent being can be justified solely by a priori reasoning, without recourse to empirical evidence.
The thesis claims that a maximally great, personal, transcendent deity exists as the ultimate ground of reality. The claim is contested, with philosophical arguments both supporting and challenging it, notably cosmological/ontological reasoning versus the divine hiddenness problem.
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