Divine Hiddenness Compatible with God via Soul‑Making Theodicy
The thesis claims that divine hiddenness can be reconciled with a maximally great, personal God if the hiddenness serves a soul‑making purpose, thereby functioning as a theodicy.
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The atlas · 9 theses · 13 relationships
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5 theses with status Underdetermined
The thesis claims that divine hiddenness can be reconciled with a maximally great, personal God if the hiddenness serves a soul‑making purpose, thereby functioning as a theodicy.
The thesis claims that the pervasive lack of clear, unambiguous experiences of a maximally great, personal deity constitutes strong evidential grounds to doubt such a being’s existence. This hinges on the idea that a perfectly loving God would make Himself known, and the observed hiddenness therefore counts against the hypothesis.
The evidential problem of evil argues that the existence of apparently gratuitous evil lowers the probability of a maximally great, personal, transcendent deity, providing strong evidential grounds for doubt.
The thesis claims that the notion of a maximally great being is internally contradictory and thus incoherent. The available sources only describe the concept (e.g., Anselm's definition) and note difficulties in logical vocabulary, offering no decisive proof of inconsistency.
The thesis claims that belief in a maximally great, personal, transcendent being can be justified solely by a priori reasoning, without recourse to empirical evidence.
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