Humans have an immaterial soul.
The claim that each human possesses a non‑physical, survivable soul is historically widespread but faces serious competing doctrines and a lack of empirical confirmation, leaving its status underdetermined.
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The atlas · 30 theses · 34 relationships
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3 theses in Philosophy of mind with status Underdetermined
The claim that each human possesses a non‑physical, survivable soul is historically widespread but faces serious competing doctrines and a lack of empirical confirmation, leaving its status underdetermined.
The thesis that current artificial systems can be conscious is contested. Functionalist accounts suggest any system replicating the brain's causal roles could be conscious, yet leading philosophers argue that present AI lack crucial features such as recurrent processing and a global workspace, leaving the claim underdetermined.
The claim is that personal identity is constituted by psychological continuity—overlapping memories, intentions, and character—rather than by mere biological persistence.
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